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UCC § 2-702(2): AN INVALID STATE PRIORITY IN
BANKRUPTCY
Section 67c(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act' empowers a trustee in
bankruptcy to avoid every statutory lien which first becomes effective
upon the debtor's insolvency. This provision qualifies the general
validity accorded statutory liens under § 67b' by invalidating those
liens which are essentially state priorities. Such liens do not confer
any rights against property prior to insolvency of the debtor, but
merely determine the order of distribution of the bankrupt's assets.
Thus, these liens operate to confer priority status upon certain unsecured creditors.3
The priority of unsecured claims in the federal scheme of distribution is determined according to § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.4 That
section has specifically excluded state-created priorities from favored
treatment since passage of the Chandler Act in 1938.5 Section
67c(1)(A) preserves the federal scheme of priorities as set out in § 64
by specifically invalidating priorities which would otherwise be upheld as statutory liens under the broad provisions of § 67b. Therefore,
any statutory lien which is rendered invalid under § 67c(1) (A) is
I Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A)(1970), provides that
"every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the debtor,
or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution against his
property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor" shall be invalid against
the trustee.
2 Bankruptcy Act § 67b, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1970). The Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§
1-703, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), eliminated the recognition originally given state priorities
in bankruptcy, except for a limited priority for landlords. The change was made in the
interests of national uniformity in the distribution of a bankrupt's assets. Nonetheless,
in recognition of valid property interests created by state law, the Act gave explicit
recognition for the first time to the general validity of statutory liens in § 67b. However,
to meet situations in which states might express priorities in terms of liens and thus
disrupt the new federal scheme of priorities as prescribed in § 64 of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), § 67c imposed limitations on the scope of § 67b. Section
67c was amended in 1952 and completely revised in 1966 to insure further the supremacy of the federal order of distribution. For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution
of present § 67c, see 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRuPTcY § 67.20 (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as COLUER].
3 S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2456, 2461.
1 Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides that certain general
claims against the bankrupt estate and costs and expenses of bankruptcy proceedings
are to receive priority in advance of payment to other general creditors. See generally
3A COLLIER, supra note 2, § 64.02 et seq.
5 See note 2 supra.
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likewise implicitly invalidated by § 64.6
Trustees in bankruptcy have invoked their powers under §
67c(1)(A)7 to challenge the exercise of a seller's right to reclaim goods
pursuant to § 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)8
prior to distribution of a bankrupt buyer's assets among other unsecured creditors.' Section 2-702(2) accords the seller of goods on credit
who discovers his buyer has received the goods while insolvent the
right to reclaim those goods if he makes demand within ten days of
the buyer's receipt."0 The subsection also provides that reclamation
is the seller's only remedy in cases involving the buyer's fraudulent
or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or intent to pay." Section
2-702(3) further provides that successful reclamation is an exclusive
remedy and that the seller's right to reclaim is subject to the rights
of buyers in the ordinary course of business and other good faith
2
purchasers.'
1 Either § 64 or § 67c(1) (A) may be used by a trusteein bankruptcy to invalidate
statutory liens which are in essence state priorities. However, § 67c(1)(A) specifically
addresses the situation in which a priority is expressed by a state in terms of a lien
and explicitly provides that such a lien is invalid against the trustee. See notes 1 & 2
supra.
See text accompanying note 1 supra.
U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1972 version) is state law in all United States jurisdictions
except Louisiana and provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on
credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made
within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency
has been made to the particular seller in writing within three months
before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim
goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or intent to pay.
The trustee has been successful in the following cases: Cohen & Sons, Inc. v.
Perskey & Wolf, Inc., (In re Perskey & Wolf, Inc.), 19 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 812 (N.D.
Ohio 1976); Carnation Plastic Mfg. Co. v. Giltex, Inc., (In re Giltex, Inc.), 17 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Queensboro Farm Products v. Wetson's Corp., (In re
Wetson's Corp.), 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REp. SERV.
1142 (E.D.Mich. 1973). The reclaiming seller has prevailed in Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.
Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.), 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S.Ct. 1466 (1976) and In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
30 The ten-day limitation is inapplicable if a written misrepresentation of solvency
was made to the seller within three months before delivery. See note 8 supra.
I See note 8 supra.
12 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides that "[tihe seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course and other good faith

purchaser under this Article . .

.

.Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the
validity of § 2-702(2) against the trustee's challenge in Alfred M.
remedies with respect to them. As amended 1966." Prior to the 1966 amendment to
the Official Text of the U.C.C., § 2-702(3) also made the seller's right to reclaim subject
to the rights of lien creditors. Since a trustee in bankruptcy may claim the status of a
lien creditor under Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)(1970) and U.C.C. § 9301(3), cases arose in which trustees asserted their rights as lien creditors to defeat
reclaiming sellers. In In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960), the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that § 2-702(3) required application of state common law in
determining the respective rights of lien creditors and defrauded sellers. The Third
Circuit assumed that a § 2-702(2) reclaiming seller is a defrauded seller entitled to the
same rights accorded the defrauded seller at common law. Since Pennsylvania common law subordinates a defrauded seller's rights to those of a lien creditor, the court
in Kravitz held for the trustee in bankruptcy. Following the Kravitz rationale, the
Sixth Circuit in Johnson & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re
Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968), reached the opposite result by
applying Kentucky common law which favors a defrauded seller over a lien creditor.
However, since § 2-702(2) requires no proof of fraud, state common law concerning the
equities of defrauded sellers and lien creditors should not apply in favor of sellers who
have not been defrauded and seek to reclaim under that subsection. See text accompanying notes 27-31 infra. Cf. In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1142, 1150 (E.D.
Mich. 1973) (Michigan common law requires seller claiming status of a defrauded
seller to establish that buyer did not intend to pay for the goods). But see Hawkland,
The Relative Rights of Lien Creditorsand Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform
Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 COM. L.J. 86 (1962). Furthermore, the reference in former § 2-702(3) to the rights of lien creditors apparently
indicates that application of Article 9 priority rules in determining the seller's rights
may be appropriate. As an unsecured creditor of the buyer, a § 2-702(2) reclaiming
seller who has not been defrauded appears to have no greater rights with respect to
lien creditors under former § 2-702(3) than a seller who has an unperfected security
interest in goods. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1). Since § 9-301(1)(b) gives priority to a lien
creditor over a creditor with an unperfected security interest, a lien creditor also should
prevail over an unsecured seller. Therefore, by providing that a reclaiming seller is
subject to the rights of a lien creditor, former § 2-702(3) allows the trustee in bankruptcy to prevail both under the U.C.C. priority scheme and at common law whenever
the seller has not in fact been defrauded.
Subsequent to the Kravitz decision, however, six states, including California,
amended § 2-702(3) by deleting the reference to lien creditors. The Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. proposed the deletion as a uniform amendment in 1966,
and 17 states have adopted the amendment to date. W. WnLIFR & F. HART, 6 U.C.C.
REP.-DIGEST § 2-702 at 1-172 (1975). Under the amended subsection, the seller's rights
are subjected only to the rights of buyers in the ordinary course of business and other
good faith purchasers. The deletion of the reference to lien creditors indicates that their
rights as defined in § 9-301 no longer operate to give them priority over a § 2-702(2)
reclaiming seller. Thus, amended § 2-702(3) precludes the trustee in bankruptcy from
defeating reclaiming sellers by asserting his status as a lien creditor under § 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act, and the trustee must look to other provisions of the Act to defeat the
seller's claim. See text accompanying notes 48-53, 73-82, 90-97 and note 87 infra.
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Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises,Inc.). 3 Telemart
Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation formed to engage in the
sale and delivery of retail merchandise, opened for business on September 13, 1970. The corporation immediately experienced operational difficulties and petitioned for a Chapter XI arrangement" on
September 29. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. had sold $61,587.43 worth of
frozen foods and groceries to Telemart on credit, and had delivered
the goods periodically from August 27 through September 25. Lewis
learned of Telemart's petition on September 30 and demanded the
return of the delivered goods pursuant to § 2-702(2).1The Ninth Circuit rejected the trustee's claim that the subsection
was invalid under § 67c(1)(A) and maintained that the subsection
does not prevent the kind of abuse which § 67c was designed to
prevent."6 The court conceded that § 2-702(2) "evades the spirit" of
§ 64,' 7 but upheld its validity by adopting the view that § 2-702(2)
simply authorizes the "exact equivalent" of the common law remedy
of rescission traditionally granted defrauded sellers.",
Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C. by state legislatures, courts
recognized the common law rights of a seller of goods on credit who
had been fraudulently induced to enter the sales contract to rescind
that contract and reclaim his goods. 9 Only a defeasible or "voidable"
title passed to the fraudulent buyer, and if no subsequent innocent
' 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976).

" 11 U.S.C. ch. 11, §§ 701-709 (1970). A Chapter XI arrangement is a supervised
plan whereby the insolvent debtor devises the settlement, satisfaction or extension of
time of payment of his debts with his unsecured creditors.
'1 The Ninth Circuit addressed itself only to the issue of the validity of § 2-702(2)
in bankruptcy proceedings. Having determined that the subsection was valid, the
court remanded the case for a new hearing on the question of whether Telemart was
insolvent prior to September 29. Section 2-702(2) is operative only when a buyer
receives goods while insolvent. See note 8 supra.
"1 524 F.2d at 764. The court reasoned that the provisions of § 67c were designed
to invalidate only those statutory liens which would have been invalid under § 60 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970), had they not been designated liens. But
see text accompanying notes 83-93 infra.
" 524 F.2d at 766.
" Id. at 765.
" Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876); California Conserving Co. v.
D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933). See also Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of
Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REv. 435, 454 (1971). A party who had been
fraudulently induced to enter a contract of sale could elect either to affirm the transaction and sue for damages or rescind the contract. Courts allowed rescission because
permitting the contract to stand when the defrauded party would not have entered into
it had he known the truth would have been inequitable. Similar grounds afforded
contracting parties the right to rescind at common law when mistake or duress were
involved in the inducement of the contract such that mutual assent to the transaction
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purchasers were involved, title revested in the seller upon his showing
that he had in fact been defrauded."0 Since the trustee in bankruptcy
acquired no better title than that of his bankrupt, his title to the
goods was also subject to divestiture upon the seller's showing of
2
fraud. '
The only support offered by the court in Telemart for its assertion
that § 2-702(2) authorizes the "exact equivalent" of the common law
remedy of rescission for fraud was a reference to an Official Comment
to § 2-702.2 The comment states that a buyer's receipt of goods while
insolvent is "a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency" and
therefore "fraudulent as against the particular seller." A consideration of the grounds for rescission by a seller under the common law,
however, indicates that § 2-702(2) clearly extends the common law.
The principal drafter of § 2-702(2) himself acknowledged that the
subsection gives a reclaiming seller greater rights than he possessed
was improperly obtained. See, e.g., Royal v. Goss, 154 Ala. 117, 45 So. 231 (1907);
Neale v. Wright, 130 Ky. 146, 112 S.W. 1115 (1908); Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153,
13 N.E. 596 (1887); 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES, §§ 650, 656-658 (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter
cited as WILLISTON].
20 The concept of voidable title protects subsequent good faith purchasers for
value and thus encourages the transferability of goods in commerce. Under the doctrine, the seller who has been fraudulently induced by a buyer to enter a contract of
sale may avoid the transaction at his option and recover the goods as against the
fraudulent buyer. However, a subsequent good faith purchaser for value acquires an
indefeasible title from the fraudulent buyer which may not be disturbed by the seller.
See, e.g., Clark & White, Inc. v. Fitzgerald, 332 Mass. 603, 127 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1955);
WIU.ISTON, supra note 19, § 650, at 503. The U.C.C. does not define the concept of
voidable title, but recognizes its validity in § 2-403(1) which restates the rule that a
person with voidable title can transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
Furthermore, under U.C.C. § 1-103, this common law doctrine remains viable as a
"supplementary general principle of law." See generally Gilmore, The Commercial
Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
22 York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U.S. 344 (1906); Hewit v. Berlin Mach. Works,
194 U.S. 296 (1904); Creel v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 383 F. Supp. 871, aff'd,
510 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1975); Sparrenberger v. National City Bank of Evansville (In
re Woodruff), 272 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 940 (1960). Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970), provides that the trustee is vested with
the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition.
2 524 F.2d at 765.
3 U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2 states that "[slubsection (2) takes as its base line
the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a
tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent as against the
particular seller." The court's complete reliance on the comment is particularly troublesome since the official comments have not been adopted by the California legislature.
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at common law. 21 Professor Llewellyn nonetheless contended that §
2-702(2) only "slightly enlarge[d]" the prior existing law of reclamation by standardizing the misrepresentation of solvency which would
give rise to a right to rescind.2 This standardization has also been
characterized as having established a "conclusive presumption" that
in every case in which a buyer has received goods while insolvent, he
has in fact defrauded his seller.2"
Section 2-702(2), however, does more than "slightly enlarge" the
prior law. Under the common law, the reclaiming seller had the burden of proving that he had a superior title and right to possession of
the goods in question as against the bankrupt or his trustee in bankruptcy. 27 Thus the seller would prevail only if he could affirmatively
prove that he had been defrauded.2 To establish fraud, various jurisdictions required the seller to show either that the buyer had not
intended to pay for the goods when he ordered them on credit, 2 that
21

K.

LLEWELLYN, MEMORANDUM IN 1 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N, REPORT AND RECORD

OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, LEGIs.

Doc. No. 65(b), 126 (1954).

Id.
26 Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code;
Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERs L. REV. 518, 549 (1960);
King, Reclamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 REF. J.
81, 82 (1970). To characterize § 2-702(2) as establishing a "conclusive presumption"
of fraud is in effect to say that the subsection does not establish any evidentiary
25

presumptions at all. As Professor Wigmore noted,
Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed,
in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing

by any evidence that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really
providing that, where the first fact is shown to exist, the second fact's
existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the proponent's case;
and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law, and not a rule
apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or
varying the duty of coming forward with evidence.
9 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2492 at 292 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted). See also C.
McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 342, at 804 (2d ed. 1972).

2? See, e.g., National Silver Co. v. Nicholas, 205 F.2d 52, 55 (5th Cir. 1953) (seller
has "burden of adducing facts sufficient to establish that its claim to possession is
superior to the primafacie right of the trustee"); Rochford v. New York Fruit Auction
Corp., 116 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir. 1940) (charge of fraud must be "thoroughly proven");
Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 19 28)("in every case the fraud must
be established to the satisfaction of the court by evidence clear, unequivocal, and
convincing").
See cases cited in note 27 supra.
Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876)(agent who had made purchase for
bankrupt defendant testified that at the time of purchase he did not expect that he or
the defendant would pay for the goods); United Constr. Co. v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942)(seller's demonstration that buyer was
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the buyer had induced the sale by knowingly concealing his hopeless
insolvency when he ordered the goods,3" or that he had induced the
sale by false material misrepresentations of his financial status.3'
In every case, the "true ground" for rescission was the buyer's
fraudulent intent which induced the contract of sale.2 Since that
intent was most difficult for the seller to demonstrate, courts sought
to alleviate the seller's burden in the situation where the buyer had
simply concealed his hopeless insolvency by inferring intent from
facts which established the buyer's knowledge of his condition when
he ordered the goods." The courts inferred that one who ordered
goods while hopelessly insolvent could not reasonably have intended
to pay for them. The requirement remained, however, that the seller
present sufficient facts regarding the buyer's situation from which the
inference of fraudulent intent could be drawn." Courts clearly emphasized that the mere fact that a buyer was insolvent when he
ordered the goods was insufficient to support a finding of fraud.,
The event which entitles a seller to rescind and reclaim under §
2-702(2), the buyer's receipt of goods while insolvent,36 differs significantly from events which supported inferences of fraudulent intent
in pre-Code cases. In those cases, intent not to pay was inferred from
insolvent at the time of purchase was insufficient without further proof to support a
finding that buyer had no intention of paying for the goods).
31Rochford v. New York Fruit Auction Corp., 116 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir.
1940) (seller's showing that buyer was insolvent at the time of purchase was insufficient
without further proof to support a finding of "absence of hope" on the part of buyer);
California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1933) (buyer knew at
the time of purchase that his affairs had become so precarious that his ability to pay
was clearly compromised); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928)
(officers in control of bankrupt corporation knew at the time of purchase that the
corporation was "hopelessly insolvent"); Gillespie v. J. C. Piles & Co., 178 F. 886 (8th
Cir. 1910) (buyer knew at the time of purchase that he had and could obtain no money
or credit with which to pay for hogs ordered).
1' Sternberg v. American Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934)(seller relied upon
false financial statements submitted by buyer to commercial agency); In re Indiana
Concrete Pipe Co., 33 F.2d 594 (N.D.Ind. 1929) (false financial statement furnished to
seller); In re Bendall, 183 F. 816 (N.D.Ala. 1910)(buyer made false'statements in
writing concerning his assets and liabilities and the condition of his bank account).
3' WILLSTON, supra note 19, § 637 at 457.
0 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
3 See cases cited in note 27 supra.
33Thus, one court noted that "[m]any an insolvent obtains goods on credit with
the honest intent to pay for them and many times he succeeds in doing so." Gillespie
v. J. C. Piles Co., 178 F. 886, 890 (8th Cir. 1910). See also United Constr. Co. v. Milam,
124 F.2d 670 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942); WILLISTON, supra note 19, §
637 at 457.
U.C.C. § 2-702(2).

170

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

facts which existed at the time the buyer ordered the goods." The
fraud involved was fraud in the inducement, and rescission was allowed on the basis that the seller would not have entered the contract
of sale had he known the buyer did not intend to pay.3 Section 2702(2), however, wholly disregards any consideration of fraud in the
inducement. 39 The buyer's intent at the time the contract of sale was
made has no relevance in determining its applicability. 0 Instead,
rescission is automatically granted when the buyer receives goods
while insolvent. If the buyer does not inform the seller before delivery,
the seller may exercise his right to reclaim and recover the goods.
Arguably, a buyer's failure to inform his seller that he has become
insolvent prior to delivery and can no longer pay for the goods may
indicate a lack of good faith on the part of the buyer. Indeed, his
silent acceptance of the goods may be interpreted as a "tacit business
misrepresentation of solvency" at that point.4' Nevertheless, such
silence does not constitute fraud in the inducement because it did not
induce the seller to enter the contract of sale.4" Thus the seller would
3
not be entitled to rescind under traditional common law principles.1
Section 2-702(2), therefore, discards those principles by which fraud
in the inducement entitled the seller to rescission44 and instead establishes the buyer's insolvency upon receipt of the goods as a new and
different ground for rescission. Moreover, since actual fraud is not
required, rescission cannot be based on the concept of "voidable
5 See cases cited in note 30 supra.
See note 19 supra.
' See note 42 infra.
,0 Professor Honnold noted that the apparent assumption of fraudulent intent
made in Official Comment 2 to § 2-702(2) "is particularly hazardous since the agreement to buy may have been well in advance of the date for delivery and at a time when
buyer had grounds for believing that he could pay." 1 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N, STUDY
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65(c), 548-49 (1955).
' U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2.
12 Non-disclosure of changed circumstances generally is considered fraudulent
only when it concerns circumstances that actually induce the contract of sale.
WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 631, at 430. Section 2-702(2), however, allows rescission
for changed circumstances which occur after the contract is made, regardless of the
intent of the parties when they entered the contract.
"' See note 42 supra.
" The subsection explicitly provides that it is the seller's only remedy in cases
based on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or intent to
pay. Thus, § 2-702(2) simultaneously extends the seller's common law right to reclaim
and limits the remedy available to sellers who have in fact been defrauded by requiring
that they demand reclamation within ten days of the buyer's receipt of the goods. See
note 8 supra.
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title. ' 4 5 Thus, the seller is allowed to recover goods when full title has
passed to the7 buyer"6 and subsequently has vested in the trustee in
bankruptcy1
The court in In re Telemart s asserted that "[n]othing in the
Bankruptcy Act prevents a state from authorizing rescission for
grounds other than those recognized at common law."4 However,
both § 67c(1) (A) and § 64 prohibit such state authorization when the
result operates to disrupt the federal scheme of distribution of a
bankrupt's assets." Section 2-702(2) clearly accords the seller his
statutory right to reclaim only in the event of the buyer's insolvency. 51
Furthermore, while the Bankruptcy Act offers no guidance with regard to what constitutes a lien thereunder,52 § 2-702(2) in effect gives
the seller a lien on the goods he seeks to reclaim and therefore may
be invalidated by the trustee under § 67c(1)(A). 3
See note 20 supra.
, Under U.C.C. § 2-401(2), title passed to the buyer upon delivery of the goods.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Graham, 29 Md. App. 422, 349 A.2d 271 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975);
A. M. Knitwear Corp. v. All-America Export-Import Corp., 50 App. Div.2d 574, 375
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1975).
7 See note 21 supra.
4'524 F.2d 761, cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976).
"Id. at 766.
: See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
' Although the seller may not exercise his right unless he complies with the
requirements of the subsection, the right itself is operative only upon insolvency and
has no meaning prior to insolvency. 4A COLLIER, supra note 2, § 70.41 at 492. Furthermore, while the U.C.C. definition of insolvency in § 1-201(23) is broader than the
Bankruptcy Act definition in § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19)(1970), one court has noted that
the event which generally triggers the demand for reclamation is the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy. In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1142, 1152 n.22 (E.D.Mich.
1973).
52 Bankruptcy Act § 1 (29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (29a)(1970), provides:
Statutory lien shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute upon
specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien
provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether
or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute
and whether or not the agreement or lien is made fully effective by
statute.
The Act thus distinguishes between statutory and consensual liens, yet fails to define
the term "lien."
4 See text accompanying notes 66-71 infra. Section 2-502 of the U.C.C. confers
upon the buyer a right similar in some respects to that given the seller under § 2-702(2).
Section 2-502(1) allows a buyer who has paid part or all of the price of goods in which
he has a "special property" (obtained under § 2-501 by identification of existing goods)
and who makes and keeps good a tender of any unpaid portion of the price, to recover
the goods from a seller who becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first
installment on the price. The section thus operates in bankruptcy to prevent the goods
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At common law, the unpaid seller of goods was accorded a possessory lien54 for the duration of the period in which he retained possession of the goods sold. The seller's lien essentially allowed him to keep
the goods and rescind the contract of sale whenever the buyer failed
to pay.i5 In the case of the buyer's supervening insolvency and as long
as the goods remained in the possession of a carrier in transit, the lien
continued under the seller's right of "stoppage in transitu."I" This
right to stop during transit was based on the fiction that the seller
remained in "possession" of the goods during that period. 57 The
seller's lien, then, ended with delivery to the buyer unless the parties
from being valued and distributed among general creditors as assets of the bankrupt's
estate. It also allows the buyer to recover the goods regardless of the fact that their
value may exceed the contract price and that the result in such a case would be a
diminution of available assets for distribution in bankruptcy.
While it has been contended that § 2-502 is also premised on a fraud theory, 1 P.
COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACI-ONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-

CODE, § 10.04[2][b] (1963), the section does not require any proof of fraud.
Rather, recovery of the goods is allowed whenever the seller becomes insolvent within
ten days after receipt of the first installment of the price. Furthermore, unlike § 2702(2), § 2-502 does not provide for rescission of the contract of sale, but entitles the
buyer to specific performance. At common law, the defrauded buyer who had not
CIAL

acquired title to the goods was allowed to rescind the contract of sale and recover any

traceable payments he had made thereunder. Hirsch v. Morton, 13 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir.
1926); In re Thompson, 4 F. Supp. 921 (W.D.Wash. 1933); 5 S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, CONTRACTS, §§ 1373, 1525 (rev. ed. 1937).
The impracticability of tracing payments, particularly when the seller was insolvent, led some common law courts to grant the buyer an "equitable lien" on the goods
in the seller's possession when the buyer's prepayment was made to finance the seller's
production. Hurley v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 213 U.S. 126 (1909); Grief Bros.
Cooperage Co. v. Mullinix, 264 F. 391 (8th Cir. 1920). Arguably, § 2-502 codifies the
concept of the buyer's "equitable lien," applying it whenever the buyer has made an
advance payment on goods in which he has a special property. Section 2-502, however,
should be invalid against the trustee in bankruptcy under § 67c(1)(A) for, like § 2702(2), it is a statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the debtor's insolvency.
See note 52 supra and text accompanying notes 68-73 infra; Countryman, Buyers and
Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEX. L. REv. 435 (1971).
11The common law possessory lien was simply a right to retain possession of the

property of another to secure payment of a debt. During the nineteenth century,
legislatures began to recognize non-possessory lien interests as well and to allow foreclosure on liened property. Some statutes also provided that certain lienors had rights
to recover deficiency judgments when the proceeds of the sale did not satisfy the full
debt. In its broadest sense, however, a lien is simply a hold on property to secure
performance of a duty or obligation. See generally R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §
107 (2d ed. 1955); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33.2
(1965).
WILLISTON,

supra note 19, § 503 at 99.

See generally WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 517 et seq.
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agreed that the lien should continue after delivery.The common law lienor had no right to sell the subject matter of
his lien." Thus the liened property was forced to carry the full debt
or obligation."0 The Uniform Sales Act gave statutory recognition to
the unpaid seller's lien6 and further provided for resale and additional recovery if the seller did not realize the full contract price."2
Under both the common law and the Uniform Sales Act, the seller
had a "specific lien" on the goods sold. 3 His lien secured the sales
price of all goods sold pursuant to a single contract, but he could not
have refused delivery to secure other contract obligations of the
buyer. 4
Statutory recognition of the unpaid seller's specific lien was carried over into the U.C.C., which also allows for resale and recovery
5
by the seller of the difference between contract and resale price.
Section 2-702(1) specifically provides that in the case of the buyer's
insolvency, the seller "may refuse delivery except for cash including
payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract.""
Furthermore, § 2-702(2) provides that when goods are sold on credit,
the seller's lien continues even after delivery. In particular, the seller
is accorded a specific lien as security for payment of the price if the
buyer is insolvent upon receipt of the goods. 7 Indeed, § 2-702(2)
simply extends the unpaid seller's lien recognized at common law and
I Gregory v. Morris, 96 U.S. 619 (1877). See generally WILLISTON, supra note 19,
§ 511 et seq.
11Since the common law lienor was allowed to keep the goods under the lien, he
naturally could sell or otherwise dispose of them as he pleased. However, his right to
sell the goods arose out of the fact that they were once again his property and did not
inhere in his status as a lienor.
" Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 645 (1900). A seller would
exercise his rights under his seller's lien simply by retaining possession of the goods
and thereby rescinding the contract of sale. Any later resale of the goods would be
unrelated to the exercise of those rights. See note 59 supra.
" UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 60-62 (act withdrawn). The Uniform Sales Act was the
predecessor of Article 2 of the U.C.C. and is specifically repealed by U.C.C. § 10-102.
'" UNIFORM SALES ACT § 60(1)(act withdrawn).
0 The specific lien extends only to indebtedness due the lienor with respect to the
specific property in which the lien is claimed. The common law general lien, however,
relates not only to the indebtedness on specific property but also to the general account
between the parties. See generally R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 107-109 (2d ed.
1955).
" Id., § 108 at 523-25.
U.C.C. §§ 2-702(1), 2-703, 2-705, 2-706.

U.C.C. § 2-702(1).
" See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra and note 68 infra. But see Braucher,

Reclamation of Goods from a FraudulentBuyer, 65

MICH.

L. REv. 1281 (1967).
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under the Uniform Sales Act. The lien, rather than expiring with
delivery of the goods, continues for ten days thereafter when the
goods are received by an insolvent buyer. 8 The fiction underlying the
seller's right to stoppage in transitu9 is thus extended so that the
seller remains in "possession" not only during the period of transport,
but also for ten days following delivery. His rights under the lien are
essentially the same rights accorded the unpaid seller under the original common law possessory lien; he may keep the goods and rescind
the contract of sale. 0
The seller must meet the requirement of § 2-702(2) in order to
exercise his rights, which are subject under § 2-702(3) to the rights
of buyers in the ordinary course of business and other good faith
purchasers. 1 Subsection (3) also provides that successful reclamation
is an exclusive remedy, so that the reclaiming seller does not have the
additional right to recover the difference between contract and resale
a seller who has not yet delivered under § 2price that is granted
72
702(1) and § 2-706.
Several federal district courts7 3 have held that § 2-702(2) is a
statutory lien which is invalid against a trustee in bankruptcy under
§ 67c(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act. In CarnationPlastic Mfg. Co. v.
Giltex, Inc. (In re Giltex),74 the District Court for the Southern District of New York maintained that § 2-702(2) secures payment of the
U.C.C. § 2-702(2). While § 2-702(2) does not expressly provide for termination
of the lien upon payment of the debt, the subsection apparently requires that if the
buyer tenders a cash payment for the goods concerned, including all goods previously
delivered under the contract, within the ten-day period, the seller must accept the
payment and cannot reclaim. If under § 2-702(1) the seller must accept cash payment
for goods still in his possession and deliver such goods, it follows that he must also
accept cash payment for goods already delivered. See text accompanying note 66
supra. See also U.C.C. § 2-511(1).
" See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
70 See note 60 supra.
71 U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
7'2See text accompanying note 65 supra. Comment 3 to § 2-702 indicates that a
policy judgment underlies the denial to a reclaiming seller of any additional remedies.
The comment provides that all other remedies are barred because the seller's right to
reclaim under § 2-702(2) "constitutes preferential treatment as against the buyer's
other creditors."
The fact that the seller is denied these remedies should not prevent the subsection
from being characterized as a lien. Rights of foreclosure and allowance of deficiency
judgments are created by state legislatures and are not inherent lien rights. Carnation
Plastic Mfg. Co. v. Giltex, Inc. (In re Giltex, Inc.), 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 887 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); see note 54 supra and text accompanying notes 74-77 infra.
7 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
7, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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price by the buyer and thus constitutes a lien.1 5 The court noted that
since the seller's interest "in respect of the goods" is determinative
of his status as a lienor, 6 it is irrelevant that he is not granted additional rights against the buyer over and above his interest in the
goods.77 The court held that § 2-702(2) was invalid against the trustee
under § 67c(1) (A) as a statutory lien that, by its own terms, takes
effect only when the buyer is insolvent.78 The court also determined
that § 2-702(2) confers favored treatment upon a particular class of
creditors, unsecured sellers of goods, thereby disrupting the federally
created order of priorities in bankruptcy.79 The district court in In re
80
Federal's,
held that § 2-702(2) was invalid against the trustee under
§ 67c(1)(A) because the practical effect of the subsection is to grant
the seller lien rights which attach only upon the insolvency of the
buyer.8 That court also noted that § 2-702(2) gives the reclaiming
seller a priority over the bankrupt's other general creditors.2
The Ninth Circuit in Telemart, however, refused to characterize
§ 2-702(2) as a statutory lien that first becomes effective upon the
debtor's insolvency. The court correctly noted that § 67c is a "remedial trimming back" of the general validity accorded statutory liens
by § 67b,11 but failed to consider the full scope of § 67c and its
relationship to § 64.A The court of appeals contended that § 67c is
11Id. at 891. But see In re National Belles Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
7' 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 887, 891 n.7 (S.DN.Y. 1975).
Id. See note 72 supra.
' Id. at 889. See note 51 supra.

7, Id. at 893. Accord, In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J.
1974). The Chandler Act, see note 2 supra,eliminated the recognition of state priorities
in § 64 to assure national uniformity in the distribution of a bankrupt's assets. Arguably, a priority created under the U.C.C. does not undermine national uniformity because the U.C.C. has been adopted in all United States jurisdictions except Louisiana.
Nevertheless, the priority accorded the unsecured seller is clearly not recognized by §
64 which specifically lists those claims which Congress has determined are to receive
favored treatment. Furthermore, by placing the reclaiming seller ahead of other general creditors of the bankrupt, § 2-702(2) upsets a fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Act which is to assure an equitable distribution of a bankrupt's estate. See S.
REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2456, 2461.
" 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1142 (E.D.Mich. 1973), noted in Henson, Reclamation

Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975).

"

12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 1153.
Id. at 1151.
524 F.2d at 764.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
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designed to invalidate only those statutory liens that were created in
an attempt to escape the effects of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act
through validation under § 67b.11 The court concluded that § 2-702(2)
does not constitute a voidable preference under § 60, 87 and that the
524 F.2d at 764. Bankruptcy Act § 67b provides:
The provisions of section 60 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding and except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c) of this section,
statutory liens . . . created or recognized by the laws of the United
States or any State, may be valid against the trustee, even though
arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and within four
months prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this Act by or against him.
Section 67b gives expression to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to recognize statutory
liens which are valid property rights created by state law. Section 67c(1)(A), however,
invalidates those statutory liens which arise only upon the debtor's insolvency and
which are in essence priorities created by state legislatures. See 4 COLLIER, supra note
2, § 67.281[2.1] at 419-22.
524 F.2d at 764. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1) provides:
A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account
of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
and within four months before the filing by or against him of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
The court in Telemart reasoned that no transfer is made on account of an antecedent
debt under § 2-702(2) because the seller's right to reclaim attaches at the instant the
debt is created. However, the transfer of the goods is not effectuated unless the seller
in fact exercises that right, which is necessarily subsequent to the creation of the debt.
Furthermore, Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30)(1970), defines a transfer to
include all modes of "disposing of or. . . parting with property." Thus, reclamation
does involve transfer of the bankrupt's property on account of an antecedent debt.
Under § 60a(2),
a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered [for purposes of § 60a(1)] at the time when it
became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property
obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract
could become superior to the rights of the transferee . ...
The reclaiming seller's interest is perfected against lien creditors under amended § 2702(3) by demand made within ten days after the buyer's receipt of the goods. See note
12 supra. In Telemart, the seller made demand after the petition was filed to initiate
the Chapter XI arrangement. Section 60a(2) further provides that when perfection is
not made prior to the filing of the petition "it shall be deemed to have been made
immediately before the filing of the petition." Thus the transfer in Telemart was made
within four months prior to the filing for purposes of § 60a(1).
Since the effect of the transfer was to enable the seller to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other general creditors, a preference under § 60a is established.
Nevertheless, for the preference to be voidable under § 60b, the seller must have had
"reasonable cause" to know the buyer was insolvent when the transfer was made. If
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subsection thus "[does] not present the abuse which section 67c was
designed to combat." The court maintained that even if § 2-702(2)
were "conceived" as a lien,89 § 67c(1)(A) was nonetheless inapplicable.
Section 67c(1)(A), however, invalidates without qualification
every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the debtor's
insolvency. The provision strikes at liens that are essentially state
priorities, regardless of whether they would have violated § 60 had
they not been designated as liens.' Although the court in Telemart
acknowledged the function of § 67c(1) (A) to invalidate state-created
priorities," it did not recognize that § 2-702(2) is such a priority.
Section 2-702(2) clearly determines distribution of a bankrupt
buyer's assets upon his insolvency, placing the reclaiming seller
ahead of other general creditors. Indeed, the priority status accorded
the seller under § 2-702(2) is recognized even in the Official Comment
to § 2-702. Comment 3 states that "the right of the seller to reclaim
goods under this section constitutes preferential treatment, as
against the buyer's other creditors. . . ."" By allowing the trustee to
invalidate § 2-702(2), a statutory lien which operates as a statecreated priority, § 67c(1) (A) preserves the federal scheme of priorities
as set out in § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act. Furthermore, the exclusion
of state priorities from favored treatment in § 64 itself implicitly
invalidates § 2-702(2) because the subsection does accord the reclaiming seller priority status in the scheme of bankruptcy distribution.
The court in Telemart upheld the validity of § 2-702(2) in bankruptcy by incorrectly equating the seller's remedy under that section
with the defrauded seller's right to rescind at common law. 4 Section
2-702(2) does not codify the prior law, but rather establishes a new
ground for rescission-the buyer's insolvency upon receipt of the
goods. 5 Both § 67c(1) (A) and § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act provide for
the invalidation of state-created priorities in bankruptcy. These secthe time of the transfer under § 2-702(2) is deemed to be prior to the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, the trustee must always establish that the seller had reason to
know of the buyer's insolvency at that time.
" 524 F.2d at 764.
aId.
" See note 1 supra.
"

See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.

,2 524 F.2d at 764.
1 U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 3.
11See text accompanying notes 22-44 supra.
is Id.
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tions limit the powers of state legislatures to establish additional
grounds for rescission when such action disrupts the federal scheme
of distribution. Section 2-702(2) confers a distinct priority upon the
unsecured seller of goods on credit in the event of the buyer's insolvency. Moreover, it does so by according the seller lien rights similar
to those given the unpaid seller of goods in possession at common
law. 7 The subsection is therefore rendered invalid in bankruptcy proceedings under both § 67c(1)(A) and § 64. While the court in
Telemart correctly noted that only congressional legislation may
limit the powers of states to create additional grounds for rescission, 8
it failed to recognize that § 67c(1)(A) and § 64 are just such limitations.9 Congress clearly has the power to validate § 2-702(2) through
further federal legislation. 0° In the absence of such congressional
sanction, however, the subsection should be inoperative in federal
bankruptcy proceedings.
EMILIA

M. DEMEO

See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
" 524 F.2d at 766. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 4 gives Congress sole authority to make
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." State
law which conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act must succumb to the provisions of the
Act. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
" See note 2 supra.
'® See note 98 supra.
"

'

